How to Get 10% Returns a Year

Investors may be bombarded with so many different methods to value a company. Ultimately it all comes down to how much cash will be returned to the shareholder.

How much should you pay for a stock to get a 10% return? In this article I explore a valuation method that helps me find just that.

The dividend discount model

First, we need to understand that the core concept of investing is that we are investing to earn a stream of future cash flows. Ideally, the amount we receive in the future should exceed the amount we invest today.

In this exercise, I’ll make one assumption: We are long term “buy and never sell investors” who make our money through the cash a company returns to shareholders as dividends.

Using this assumption, we should use the dividend discount model to value a stock. A dividend discount model discounts all future dividend income back to the present. It also assumes that you can reinvest the dividend at a rate similar to the discount rate.

Achieving a 10% return

So how do you get a 10% return? Let’s start with a simple example. Suppose a company will pay $1 per share in dividends for 10 years. At the end of the 10 years, it closes down with no liquidation value.

In total, you will receive $10 per share in dividends.

Using a dividend discount model, and discounting all the dividends to the present day at a 10% discount rate, we can calculate that the price to pay for the stock is $6.14. You can find the calculation in this spreadsheet.

Just looking at the price alone, it may seem strange that the dividend yield that you are getting is more than 10%.

At $6.14 per share, you will be earning a dividend yield of 16.3% but your annual return is still 10%. This is because the company closes down after 10 years and your initial capital will not be returned to you. To make up for that, you need to generate more than 10% in your annual dividend yield just to make a 10% annualised return. 

More durable companies

In the above scenario, the company is not durable and is only able to pay you a dividend for 10 years. But for more durable companies, you can afford to pay more to achieve the same return.

For instance, there’s a more durable company that pays $1 per share in dividend for 20 years before closing down. In this scenario, you can pay $8.51 per share to earn a 10% return.

The more durable the company, the more you can pay. If a company can pay you $1 per share in dividend for eternity, you can pay $10 per share to earn a 10% yield and a 10% return.

Vicom – a no-growth company

An example of a steady but no-growth company is Vicom, which provides car inspection services in Singapore. It is a stable business as Singapore’s law requires vehicles to undergo regular inspections for road-worthiness. 

Vicom, with its longstanding history, is also trusted by Singapore’s authorities to provide these inspection services, making it difficult for competitors to encroach into the space. But there is limited opportunity for Vicom to grow as the authorities regulates the number of vehicles given entitlement to be owned and driven in Singapore, resulting in zero vehicle-growth in Singapore for many years. In addition, the inspection fees are also likely regulated by the government, ensuring that consumers are protected from price gouging.

As a result, Vicom’s annual net income has hovered around S$25 million for years. The company also pays out around 100% of its net profit to shareholders.

Given all of this, as well as assuming that Vicom’s business can sustain for a long period of time and we want a 10% annualised return from owning Vicom’s shares, Vicom’s value should be S$250 million, representing a dividend yield of around 10%. Vicom’s current market cap is around S$450 million, which means that shareholders will earn less than a 10% rate of return.

Amphenol – a growth stock

Amphenol Corporation, a company based in the USA, designs and manufactures electronic connectors and sensors. Unlike Vicom, Amphenol has a track record of growing revenue and earnings per share while paying a growing dividend.

Since 2011, Amphenol’s revenue and earnings per share has compounded at 10.5% and 13% per year, respectively. In addition, the company’s dividend per share has grown from US$0.02 per share in 2011 to US$0.83 per share in 2022, for an annulised growth rate of 40%. Amphenol’s business can likely continue to grow at a steady rate if the company continues to acquire other companies for growth.

How much will you pay for its stock? Let’s assume Amphenol will pay US$1 per share in dividend in 2023 and grow that dividend at 9% per year for a long period of time.

In this case, using a dividend discount model, we can calculate that to earn a 10% return on investment (assuming no dividend withholding tax), we will need to pay around US$109 per share. My calculation can be found here.

You may notice that the dividend yield based on the price we are willing to pay is only 0.9%. Yet, we can still make 10% a year because the dividend that we will collect in future years grows over time. 

Using the model 

This model can be applied to all companies as long as you can predict its dividend stream. However this model only works if you are going to be holding the company for the full duration of its lifespan. If you intend to sell the shares to someone else, the share price that you are able to sell the shares at depends on the buyer’s own required rate of return.

This can be influenced by a range of factors, such as the risk-free rate at the time of the sale, or the state of the economy. 

The model also assumes that you can predict with strong certainty the timing and amount of dividends. In practice, this may be hard to predict for companies without a history of dividend payments.

Nevertheless, this framework provides me with a clear way of thinking about valuation and gives me a sense of how I should approach valuing companies.


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. I currently do not have a vested interest in any companies mentioned. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

When DCFF Models Fail

Investors may fall into the trap of valuing a company based on cash flow to the firm. But cash flow to the firm is different from cashflow to shareholders.

Investing is based on the premise that an asset’s value is the cash flow that it generates over its lifetime, discounted to the present. This applies to all assets classes.

For real estate, the cash flow generated is rent. For bonds, it’s the coupon. For companies, it is profits.

In the case of stocks, investors may use cash flow to the firm to value a company. Let’s call this the DCFF (discounted cashflow to the firm) model. But valuing a stock based on cash flow to the firm may not always be accurate for shareholders.

This is because free cash flow generated by the firm does not equate to cash returned to the shareholder.

Take for instance, two identical companies. Both generate $1 per share in free cash flow for 10 years. Company A  hoards all the cash for 10 years before finally returning it to shareholders. Company B, however, returns the $1 in free cash flow generated to shareholders at the end of each year. 

Investors who use a DCFF model will value both companies equally. But the actual cash returned to shareholders is different for the two companies. Company B should be more valuable to shareholders as they are receiving cash on a more timely basis. 

To avoid falling for this “valuation trap”, we should use a dividend discount model instead of a DCFF model.

Companies trading below net cash

The timing of cash returned to shareholder matters a lot to the value of a stock.

This is also why we occasionally see companies trading below the net cash on its balance sheet.

If you use a DCFF model, cash on the balance sheet is not discounted. As such, a company that will generate positive cash flows over its lifetime should technically never be valued below its net cash if you are relying on a DCFF model.

However, this again assumes that shareholders will be paid out immediately from the balance sheet. The reality is often very different. Companies may withhold payment to shareholders, leaving shareholders waiting for years to receive the cash.

Double counting

Using the DCFF model may also result in double counting.

For instance, a company may generate free cash flow but use that cash to acquire another company for growth. For valuation purposes, that $1 has been invested so should not be included when valuing the asset.

Including this free cash flow generated in a DCFF model results in double counting the cash.

Don’t forget the taxes

Not only is the DCFF model an inaccurate proxy for cash flow to shareholders, investors also often forget that shareholders may have to pay taxes on dividends earned.

This tax eats into shareholder returns and should be included in all models. For instance, non residents of America have to pay withholding taxes of up to 30% on all dividends earned from US stocks.

When modelling the value of a company, we should factor this withholding taxes into our valuation model.

This is important for long term investors who want to hold the stock for long periods or even for perpetuity. In this case, returns are based solely on dividends, rather than selling the stock.

The challenges of the DDM

To me, the dividend discount model is the better way to value a stock as a shareholder. However, using the dividend discount model effectively has its own challenges.

For one, dividends are not easy to predict. Many companies in their growth phase are not actively paying a dividend, making it difficult for investors to predict the pattern of future dividend payments.

Our best guess is to see the revenue growth trajectory and to make a reasonable estimate as to when management will decide to start paying a dividend.

In some cases, companies may have a current policy to use all its cash flow to buyback shares. This is another form of growth investment for the firm as it decreases outstanding shares.

We should also factor these capital allocation policies into our models to make a better guess of how much dividends will be paid in the future which will determine the true value of the company today.


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. I don’t have a vested interest in any company mentioned. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

What We Can Learn From EC World REIT’s Troubles

Takeaways from EC World REIT’s recent financial troubles involving its inability to refinance its debt and missed collections from its key tenant.

EC World REIT (SGX: BWCU) is in hot water. The Singapore-listed real estate investment trust, which owns properties in China, is having trouble keeping sufficient funds in its interest reserves and the manager of the REIT also claims that the REIT is owed around S$27.5 million (RMB 145.8 million) from one of its tenants.

Its liquidity troubles led the REIT manager to call for a voluntary trading halt of its units. With financial issues mounting, the situation looks rather bleak for unit holders who are now left with no way to offload the units.

While unpleasant, a bad situation presents us with a learning opportunity. With that said, here are some lessons we can takeaway from EC World REIT’s troubles.

Beware of tenant concentration risk

Tenant concentration risk is a big risk for REITs.

EC World REIT is not the only REIT to suffer from missed payments by a major tenant. First REIT (SGX: AW9U), which owns healthcare properties in Indonesia, also suffered a shock a few years ago when its main tenant forced a restructuring of its master lease arrangement, leading to a drastic fall in income for the REIT.

Ability to refinance its debt

EC World REIT first ran into problems when it was unable to refinance its debt that was coming due.

REITs typically take “interest-only” loans. Unlike a home mortgage, in which the borrower pays a fixed amount every month to pay off the interest and a part of the principal, an interest-only loan is a loan where the borrower only pays interest on the loan and does not need to pay back the principal until the loan matures.

As a REIT is required to distribute 90% of its distributable income to its unitholders, a REIT usually does not have enough cash to pay back the principal when a loan matures. As such, the default option is to refinance the loan with a new loan. However, in a situation where the REIT is unable to refinance the loan, the REIT may end up with a liquidity issue.

REITs with stable assets, a diversified tenant base, other means to capital, and low debt-to-asset ratios will likely have less trouble refinancing their debt when it comes due as lenders will be willing to underwrite loans to these REITs. On the other hand, REITs that have unstable assets, tenant concentration risk, or an inability to raise other forms of capital may be at risk of being unable to refinance their debt.

Diversify your investments

A few years ago, I personally invested in both EC World REIT and First REIT (I sold both these companies in 2020). I was willing to invest in them as both offered high yields which I believed was fair compensation for the risks involved.

While there was a chance that the investments could turn sour, I was at least collecting 8-9% in annual distribution yields. Just a few good years and my distributions collected would have paid off my investment principal.

But I also made sure that these investments only made up a small percentage of my entire portfolio. If they turned out well, I would have made a decent return. But if they soured, the impact on my entire portfolio would still be minimal.

Bottom line

Investing is ultimately a game of probabilities. Some companies may provide better yields but have a higher element of risk while others provide lower yields but are less risky.

REIT investing is no different. Although investors tend to think of REITs as safer investments than companies, REITs also have their fair share of risk. REITs typical take on a lot of debt and this high leverage is one of the biggest risk factors for REITs.

In times of rising interest rates and tighter capital markets such as the current environment, the situation becomes even more uncertain for REITs. As such, we need to assess each individual REIT before investing and make sure that we diversify our investments to minimise the risk of ruin.


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. I do not have a vested interest in any companies mentioned. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

Lessons From Two Polar Opposite Companies

The ultimate goal of management should be to maximise shareholder value. This means returning as much cash (discounted to the present) as possible to shareholders over time. 

Finding the right management team that can do this is key to good long-term returns.

Constellation Software

One of the best examples of a management team that is great at maximising shareholder value is that of Constellation Software. 

Headed by Mark Leonard, the team behind Constellation Software has been consistently finding ways to grow free cash flow per share for shareholders by using the cash it generates to acquire companies on the cheap. Constellation’s secret is that it buys companies with low organic but at really cheap valuations. Although growth is low, the investments pay off very quickly due to the low valuations they were acquired for. 

The consistent use of available cash for new investments mean that Constellation’s dividend payouts have been lumpy and relatively small. But this strategy should pay off over time and enable Constellation’s shareholders to receive a much bigger dividend stream in the future. 

Not only are Leonard and his team good allocators of capital and excellent operators, they are also careful with spending shareholders’ money. In his 2007 shareholders’ letter, Leonard wrote:

“I recently flew to the UK for business using an economy ticket. For those of you who have seen me (I’m 6’5”, and tip the non-metric scale at 280 lbs.) you know that this is a bit of a hardship. I can personally afford to fly business class, and I could probably justify having Constellation buy me a business class ticket, but I nearly always fly economy. I do this because there are several hundred Constellation employees flying every week, and we expect them to fly economy when they are spending Constellation’s money. The implication that I hope you are drawing, is that the standard we use when we spend our shareholders’ money is even more stringent than that which we use when we are spending our own.”

This attitude on safeguarding shareholders’ money is exactly what Constellation’s shareholders love. This reliability is also part of the reason why Constellation has been such a big success in the stock market. The company’s stock price is up by more than 14,000% since its May 2006 IPO.

Singapore Press Holdings

On the flip side, there are companies that have management teams that do not strive to maximise shareholder value. Some hoard cash, or use the cash a company generates for pet projects that end up wasting shareholders’ money. And then, there are some management teams that have other priorities that are more important than maximising shareholder value.

Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), for example, was a company that I think did not do enough to maximise shareholder value. SPH, which is based in Singapore but delisted from the country’s stock market in May 2022, was a company that published Singapore’s most widely-read newspapers, including The Straits Times. The company also owned the online news portal, straitstimes.com, as well as other local media assets such as radio channels and magazines. In addition, SPH owned real estate such as its print and news centre that were used for its media business. SPH also had investments in SPH REIT and other real estate.

In 2021, SPH spun off its entire media arm, including its print and news centre, to a new non-profit entity. Unlike normal spin-offs or sales, SPH shareholders did not receive any shares in the new entity, nor did SPH receive any cash. Instead, SPH donated its whole media segment to the new entity for just S$1. To rub salt into shareholders’ wounds, SPH donated S$80 million in cash, S$20 million in SPH REIT units, and another $10 million in SPH shares, to the new entity. 

After the spin-off, SPH’s net asset value dropped by a whopping S$238 million. The restructuring clearly was not designed to maximise shareholder value.

Management said that SPH had to give away its media segment as selling it off or winding up the media business was not a feasible option given the “critical function the media plays in providing quality news and information to the public.”

In other words, management was torn between the interests of the country the company is in, and its shareholders. Ultimately, shareholders’ hard-earned money was squandered in the process. This was possibly one of the more brazen mishandlings of shareholder money I’ve witnessed in the last decade.

Bottom line

As minority shareholders in public companies, we often have little to no say on how things are run within a company. Our votes during shareholder meetings are overshadowed by other major shareholders who may also have conflicting interests. As such we rely on the honesty and integrity of management to put minority shareholders’ interests as a priority. 

Unfortunately, conflicts of interest do occasionally occur. As an investor, you may want to consider only investing in companies that will protect shareholders’ interests fervently such as the example shown by Mark Leonard.

On the other hand, we should avoid situations where conflicts of interest may encourage the misuse of funds or even promote dishonest behaviour.


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. I do not have a vested interest in any companies mentioned. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

When Should You Use EBITDA?

It is becoming increasingly common for companies to report adjusted earnings but when should you really make adjustments to earnings?

In the lexicon of finance, EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. It is a commonly reported metric among companies and is sometimes used by management teams to make companies appear more profitable than they actually are.

But making certain adjustments to a company’s earnings can still be useful in certain scenarios

In this article, I explore when should investors, and when should they not, make adjustments to a company’s earnings.

Interest expense

One scenario when it may be good to measure earnings before interest is when you are a bondholder. Bond holders need to see if a company has the capacity to pay its interest and earnings before interest is a good tool to measure profitability in this case. 

Another situation to remove interest is when you are an equity investor (invested in the stock of the company) and want to make year-on-year comparisons. Interest expenses can fluctuate wildly based on interest rates set by central banks. Removing interest expense gives you a better gauge of the company’s profitability without the distorting effects of interest rates.

On the other hand, if you are measuring a company’s valuation, then including interest expense is important. This gives you a closer estimate to the company’s cash flow and the amount of cash that can be returned to shareholders through dividends.

Tax expense

Tax expense is very similar to interest expense. If you are a bondholder, you should look at earnings before tax as this gives you a gauge of whether the company can pay you your bond coupon.

Like interest rates, tax rates can also vary based on laws and tax credits. This can result in tax rates changing from year to year. If you are an equity investor and want to assess how a company has done compared to prior years, it may be best to remove taxes to see the actual growth of the company. 

On the contrary, if you are valuing a company, I prefer to include taxes as it is an actual cash outflow. The company’s value should be based on actual cash flows to an investor and tax has a real impact on valuation.

Depreciation expense

Depreciation is a little trickier. Both bond and equity investors need to be wary of removing depreciation from earnings. 

In many cases, while depreciation may not be a cash expense, it actually results in a cash outflow as the company needs to replace its assets over time in the form of capital expenseditures.

Capital expenditures are a cash outflow that impacts the company’s annual cash flow. This, in turn, impacts the company’s ability to pay both its interest expense to bondholders and dividends to shareholders.

In some cases, depreciated assets do not need to be replaced, or they can be replaced at a lower rate compared to the depreciation expense recorded. This can be due to aggressive accounting methods or the assets having a longer shelf-life than what is accounted for in the income statement. In this scenario, it may be useful to use earnings before depreciation.

In any case, I find it helpful to compare depreciation expenses with capital expenditures to get a better feel for a company’s cash flow situation.

Amortisation expenses

Companies may amortise their goodwill or other intangible assets over time. In many cases, the amortisation of goodwill is a one-off expense and should be removed when making year-on-year comparisons. 

I think that both bond and equity investors should remove amortisation expense, if it is a one-off, when assessing a company.

In many cases, intangible assets and goodwill are actually long-lasting assets that still remain valuable to a company over time. However, due to accounting standards, a company may be obliged to amortise these assets and reduce their value on its balance sheet. In these cases, I prefer to remove amortisation from earnings.

On the other hand, on the cash flow statement, you may come across a line that says “purchase of intangibles”. If this is a recurring annual cash outflow, you may want to include amortisation expenses.

Other adjustments

Companies may make other adjustments and report “adjusted” EBITDA. These adjustments may include things such as stock-based compensation (SBC), foreign currency translation gains or losses, and gains or losses from the sale of assets.

These adjustments may be necessary to make more accurate year-on-year comparisons of a company’s core business. However, one exception may be SBC. This is a real expense for shareholders as it dilutes their ownership stake in a company.

While standard accounting is not a good proxy for the monetary impact of SBC, removing it altogether is also incorrect. It may be better to account for SBC by looking at earnings or cash flow on a per-share basis to account for the dilution.

Final thoughts

EBITDA and other adjustments made to earnings can be useful on many occasions especially when making year-on-year comparisons or if you are a bondholder. Removing non-recurring, non-cash expenses such as amortisation also makes sense when valuing a company.

However, there are also situations when it is better to use GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) or IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) earnings.

Some companies that are loss-making may conveniently use adjusted earnings simply to mislead investors to get their share price higher. This should be a red flag for investors.


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. I do not have a vested interest in any companies mentioned. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

What Is The Monetary Cost of Stock-Based Compensation?

Confused by stock-based compensation? Here is how investors can account for SBC when calculating intrinsiic value.

It is common today for companies to exclude stock-based compensation (SBC) when reporting “adjusted” earnings. 

In management’s eyes, SBC expense is not a cash outflow and is excluded when reporting adjusted earnings. But don’t let that fool you. SBC is a real expense for shareholders. It increases a company’s outstanding share count and reduces future dividends per share.

I’ve thought about SBC quite a bit in the last few months. One thing I noticed is that investors often do not properly account for it. There are a couple of different scenarios that I believe should lead to investors using different methods to account for SBC.

Scenario 1: Offsetting dilution with buybacks

The first scenario is when a company is both buying back shares and issuing shares to employees as SBC. The easiest and most appropriate way to account for SBC in this situation is by calculating how much the company spent to buy back the stock that vested in the year.

Take the credit card company Visa (NYSE: V) for example. In its FY2022 (fiscal year ended 30 September 2022), 2.2 million restricted stock units (RSUs) were vested and given to Visa employees. At the same time, Visa bought back 56 million shares at an average price of US$206 per share.  In other words, Visa managed to buy back all the shares that were vested, and more.

We can calculate the cash outlay that Visa spent to offset the dilution from the grants of RSUs by multiplying the number of grants by the average price it paid to buy back its shares. In Visa’s case, the true cost of the SBC was around US$453 million (2.2 million RSUs multiplied by average price of US$206).

We can then calculate how much free cash flow (FCF) was left over that could be returned to shareholders by deducting US$453 million from Visa’s FCF. In FY2022, this FCF was US$17.4 billion.

Scenario 2: No buybacks!

On the other hand, when a company is not offsetting dilution with buybacks, it becomes trickier to account for SBC.

Under GAAP accounting, SBC is reported based on the company’s stock price at the time of the grant. But in my view, this is a severely flawed form of accounting. Firstly, unless the company is buying back shares, the stock price does not translate into the true cost of SBC. Second, even if the stock price was a true reflection of intrinsic value, the grants may have been made years ago and the underlying value of each share could have changed significantly since then. 

In my view, I think the best way to account for SBC is by calculating how SBC is going to impact future dividend payouts to shareholders. This is the true cost of SBC.

Let’s use Okta Inc (NASDAQ: OKTA) as an example. In Okta’s FY2023 (fiscal year ended 31 January 2023), 2.6 million RSUs were vested and the company had 161 million shares outstanding at the end of the year (after dilution). This means that the RSUs vested led to a 1.7% rate of dilution. Put another way, all future dividends per share for Okta will be reduced by around 1.7%. Although the company is not paying a dividend yet, RSUs vested should lead to a reduction in the intrinsic value per share by 1.7%.

More granularly, I did a simple dividend discount model. I made certain assumptions around free cash flow growth and future dividend payout ratios. Using those assumptions and a 12% discount rate, I found that Okta’s intrinsic value was around US$12.5 billion.

With an outstanding share count of 161 million, Okta’s stock was worth US$77.63 each. Before dilution, Okta had 158.4 million shares and each share was worth US$78.91. The cost of dilution was around US$1.28 per share or US$201 million dollars.

Scenario 3: How about options?

In the two scenarios above, I only accounted for the RSU portion of the SBC. Both Okta and Visa also offer employees another form of SBC: Options.

Options give employees the ability to buy stock in a company in the future at a predetermined price. Unlike RSUs, the company receives cash when an option is exercised.

In this scenario, there is a cash inflow but an increase in share count. The best way to account for this is by calculating the drop in intrinsic value due to the dilution but offsetting it by the amount of cash the company receives.

For instance, Okta employees exercised 1.4 million options in FY2023 at a weighted average share price of US$11.92. Recall that we calculated our intrinsic value of shares after dilution to be US$78.91. Given the same assumptions, the cost of these options was US$66.99 per option, for a total cost of US$93.7 million.

Key takeaways

SBC can be tricky for investors to account for. Different scenarios demand different analysis methods. 

When a company is buying back shares, the amount spent on offsetting dilution is the amount that can not be used as dividends. This is the cost to shareholders. On the other hand, when no buybacks are done, a company’s future dividends per share is reduced as the number of shares grows. 

Ultimately, the key thing to take note of is how SBC impacts a company’s future dividends per share. By sticking to this simple principle, we can deduce the best way to account for SBC.


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. I have a vested interest in Okta and Visa. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

How Bad is Zoom’s Stock-Based Compensation?

On the surface, the rising stock based compensation for Zoom looks bad. But looking under the hood, the situation is not as bad as it looks.

There seems to be a lot of concern surrounding Zoom’s rising stock-based compensation (SBC).

In its financial years 2021, 2022 and 2023, Zoom recorded SBC of US$275 million, US$477 million and US$1,285 million, respectively. FY2023 was perhaps the most worrying for investors as Zoom’s revenue essentially flat-lined while its SBC increased by more than two-fold.

But as mentioned in an earlier article, GAAP accounting is not very informative when it comes to SBC. When companies report SBC using GAAP accounting, they record the amount on the financial statements based on the share price at the time of the grant. A more informative way to look at SBC would be from the perspective of the actual number of shares given out during the year.

In FY2021, 2022 and 2023, Zoom issued 0.6 million, 1.8 million and 4 million restricted stock units (RSUs), respectively. From that point of view, it seems the dilution is not too bad. Zoom had 293 million shares outstanding as of 31 January 2023, so the 4 million RSUs issued resulted in only 1.4% more shares.

What about down the road?

The number of RSUs granted in FY2023 was 22.1 million, up from just 3.1 million a year before. The big jump in FY2023 was because the company decided to give a one-time boost to existing employees. 

However, this does not mean that Zoom’s dilution is going to be 22 million shares every year from now. The number of RSUs granted in FY2023 was probably a one-off grant that will likely not recur and these grants will vest over a period of three to four years.

If we divide the extra RSUs given in FY2023 by their 4-year vesting schedule, we can assume that around 8 million RSUs will vest each year. This will result in an annual dilution rate of 2.7% based on Zoom’s 293 million shares outstanding as of 31 January 2023.

Bear in mind: Zoom guided for a weighted diluted share count of 308 million for FY2024. This diluted number includes 4.8 million in unexercised options that were granted a number of years ago. Excluding this, the number of RSUs that vest will be around 10 million and I believe this is because of an accelerated vesting schedule this year.

Cashflow impact

Although SBC does not result in a cash outflow for companies, it does result in a larger outstanding share base and consequently, lower free cash flow per share.

But Zoom can offset that by buying back its shares. At its current share price of US$69, Zoom can buy back 8 million of its shares using US$550 million. Zoom generated US$1.5B in free cash flow if you exclude working capital changes in FY2023. If it can sustain cash generation at this level, it can buy back all its stock that is issued each year and still have around US$1 billion in annual free cash flow left over for shareholders.

And we also should factor in the fact that in most companies, due to employee turnover, the RSU forfeiture rate is around 20% or more, which will mean my estimate of 8 million RSUs vesting per year for Zoom could be an overestimate. In addition, Zoom reduced its headcount by 15% in February this year, which should lead to more RSU forfeitures and hopefully fewer grants in the future.

Not as bad as it looks

GAAP accounting does not always give a complete picture of the financial health of a business. In my view, SBC is one of the most significant flaws of GAAP accounting and investors need to look into the financial notes to better grasp the true impact of SBC.

Zoom’s SBC numbers seem high. But when zooming in (pun intended), the SBC is not as bad as it looks. In addition, with share prices so low, it is easy for management to offset dilution with repurchases at very good prices. However, investors should continue to monitor share dilution over time to ensure that management is fair to shareholders.


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. I have a vested interest in Zoom. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

When Share Buybacks Lose Their Power

Apple’s share buybacks have greatly benefited shareholders in the past. But with share prices much higher, buybacks may be less powerful.

Share buybacks can be a powerful tool for companies to boost their future earnings per share. By buying back shares, a company’s future earnings can now be shared between fewer shares, boosting the amount each shareholder can get.

Take Apple for example. From 2016 to 2022, the iPhone maker’s net income increased by 118%, or around 14% annualised. That’s pretty impressive. But Apple’s earnings per share (EPS) outpaced net income growth by a big margin: EPS advanced by 193%, or 19.6% per year.

The gap exists because Apple used share buybacks to decrease its share count. Its outstanding share count dropped by around 30%, or an annualised rate of close to 5.7%, over the same period.

But the power of buybacks is very much dependent on the price at which they are conducted. If a company’s share price represents a high valuation, earnings per share growth from buybacks will be less, and vice versa.

Valuations matter

To compare how buybacks lose their effectiveness when valuations rise, let’s examine a simple illustration. There are two companies, A and B, that both earn a $100 net profit every year and have 100 shares outstanding. These give them both earnings per share of $1. Let’s say Company A’s share price is $10 while Company B’s is at $20. The two companies also use all their profits in year 1 to buy back their shares.

Companies A and B would end the year with 90 and 95 shares outstanding, respectively. From Year 2 onwards, Company A’s earnings per share will be $1.11, or an 11% increase. Company B on the other hand, only managed to increase its earnings per share to $1.052, or 5.2%.

Buybacks are clearly much more effective when the share prices, and thus the valuation, is lower.

The case of Apple

As I mentioned earlier, Apple managed to decrease its share count by 30% over the last six years or 5.7% per year. A 30% decrease in shares outstanding led to a 42% increase in EPS*. 

Apple was able to decrease its share count so significantly during the last six years because its share price was trading at relatively low valuations. Apple also used almost all of its free cash flow that it generated over the last six years to buy back shares. The chart below shows Apple’s price-to-earnings multiples from 2016.

Source: TIKR

Source: TIKR

From 2016 to 2019, Apple’s trailing price-to-earnings (PE) ratio ranged from 10 to 20. But since then, the PE ratio has increased and now sits around 30.

In the last 6 years – from 2016 to 2022 – Apple was able to reduce its share count by 30% or 5.7% a year. But with its PE ratio now at close to 30, the impact of Apple’s buybacks will not be as significant. If Apple continues to use 100% of its free cash flow to buy back shares, it will reduce its share count only by around 3.3% per year. Although that’s a respectable figure, it doesn’t come close to what Apple achieved in the 6 years prior. 

At an annual reduction rate of 3.3%, Apple’s share count will only fall by around 18% over six years, compared to the 30% seen from 2016 to 2022. This will increase Apple’s earnings per share by around 22% versus the actual 42% clocked in the past six years.

In closing

Apple is a great company that has rewarded shareholders multiple folds over the last few decades. In addition to growing its business, timely buybacks have also contributed to the fast pace of Apple’s earnings per share growth. 

Although I believe Apple will likely continue to post stellar growth in the coming years with the growth of its services business and its potential in emerging markets, growth from buybacks may not be as powerful as it used to be.

When analysing the power of buybacks, shareholders should monitor the valuation of the stock and assess whether the buybacks are worthwhile for shareholders.

*(1/1-0.3)


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. I have a vested interest in Apple. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

What Causes Stock Prices To Rise?

A company can be valued based on its future cash flows. Dividends, as cashflows to shareholders, should therefore drive stock valuations.

I recently wrote about why dividends are the ultimate driver of stock valuations. Legendary investor Warren Buffett once said: “Intrinsic value can be defined simply as the discounted value of cash that can be taken out of business during its remaining life.”

And dividends are ultimately the cash that is taken out from a business over time. As such, I consider the prospect of dividends as the true driver of stock valuations.

But what if a company will not pay out a dividend in my lifetime? 

Dividends in the future

Even though we may never receive a dividend from a stock, we should still be able to make a gain through stock price appreciation.

Let’s say a company will only start paying out $100 a share in dividends 100 years from now and that its dividend per share will remain stable from then. An investor who wants to earn a 10% return will be willing to pay $1000 a share at that time.

But it is unlikely that anyone reading this will be alive 100 years from now. That doesn’t mean we can’t still make money from this stock.

In Year 99, an investor who wants to make a 10% return will be willing to pay $909 a share as they can sell it to another investor for $1000 in Year 100. That’s a 10% gain.

Similarly, an investor knowing this, will be willing to pay $826 in Year 98, knowing that another buyer will likely be willing to pay $909 to buy it from him in a year. And on and on it goes.

Coming back to the present, an investor who wants to make a 10% annual return should be willing to pay $0.07 a share. Even though this investor will likely never hold the shares for 100 years, in a well-oiled financial system, the investor should be able to sell the stock at a higher price over time.

But be warned

In the above example, I assumed that the financial markets are working smoothly and investors’ required rate of return remained constant at 10%. I also assumed that the dividend trajectory of the company is known. But reality is seldom like this.

The required rate of return may change depending on the risk-free rate, impacting what people will pay for the stock at different periods of time. In addition, uncertainty about the business may also lead to stock price fluctuations. Furthermore, there may even be mispricings because of misinformation or simply irrational behaviour of buyers and sellers of the stock. All of these things can lead to wildly fluctuating stock prices.

So even if you do end up being correct on the future dividend per share of the company, the valuation trajectory you thought that the company will follow may end up well off-course for long periods. The market may also demand different rates of return from you leading to the market’s “intrinsic value” of the stock differing from yours.

The picture below is a sketch by me (sorry I’m not an artist) that illustrates what may happen:

The smooth line is what your “intrinsic value” of the company looks like over time. But the zig-zag line is what may actually happen.

Bottom line

To recap, capital gains can be made even if a company doesn’t pay a dividend during our lifetime. But we have to be wary that capital gains may not happen smoothly.

Shareholders, even if they are right about a stock’s future dividend profile, must be able to hold the stock through volatile periods until the stock price eventually reaches above or at least on par with our intrinsic value to make our required rate of return.

You may also have noticed from the chart that occasionally stocks can go above your “intrinsic value” line (whatever rate of return you are using). If you bought in at these times, you are unlikely to make a return that meets your required rate.

To avoid this, we need to buy in at the right valuation and be patient enough to wait for market sentiment to converge to our intrinsic value over time to make a profit that meets our expectations. Patience and discipline are, hence, key to investment success. And of course, we also need to predict the dividend trajectory of the company somewhat accurately.


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. I do not have a vested interest in any stocks mentioned. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

How Do Changing Assumptions Impact Intrinsic Values?

Are stock price movements due to new information justified? Here’s one way to find out.

It is not uncommon to see stock prices gyrate wildly during earnings season. A small earnings beat and the stock goes up 10% or even 20%. An earnings miss and the stock is down double digits after hours.

Are these stock price movements justified? Has the intrinsic value of the stock really changed that much? In this article, I look at how a change in assumptions about a company’s cash flow can affect the intrinsic value of the stock.

I take a look at what effects changing assumptions to a company’s cash flow have on the intrinsic value of the stock.

When long-term assumptions are slashed

Let’s start by analysing a stock that has its long-term assumptions slashed. This should have the biggest impact on intrinsic value compared to just a near-term earnings miss.

Suppose Company A is expected to dish out $1 in dividends every year for 10 years before it closes down in year 10 and liquidates for $5 a share. The liquidation value is paid out to shareholders as a special dividend in year 10. The table below shows the dividend schedule and the calculation of the intrinsic value of the stock today using a 10% discount rate.

YearDividendNet present value
Now$0.00$0.00
Year 1$1.00$0.91
Year 2$1.00$0.83
Year 3$1.00$0.75
Year 4$1.00$0.68
Year 5$1.00$0.62
Year 6$1.00$0.56
Year 7$1.00$0.51
Year 8$1.00$0.47
Year 9$1.00$0.42
Year 10$6.00$2.31
Sum$15.00$8.07

The intrinsic value in this case is $8.07.

But what if expectations for Company A are slashed? The dividend schedule is now expected to drop 10% to 90 cents per share for the next 10 years. The liquidation value is also cut by 10% to $4.50. The table below illustrates the new dividend expectation and the new intrinsic value of the stock.

YearDividendNet present value
Now$0.00$0.00
Year 1$0.90$0.82
Year 2$0.90$0.74
Year 3$0.90$0.68
Year 4$0.90$0.61
Year 5$0.90$0.56
Year 6$0.90$0.51
Year 7$0.90$0.46
Year 8$0.90$0.42
Year 9$0.90$0.38
Year 10$5.40$2.08
Sum$13.50$7.27

Understandably, the intrinsic value drops 10% to $7.27 as all future cash flows are now 10% less. In this case, if the stock was trading close to the initial $8.07 per share intrinsic value, then a 10% decline in the stock price can be considered justified.

When only short-term cash flows are impacted

But most of the time, expectations for a company should not change so drastically. An earnings miss may lead to expectations of lower dividends for the next couple of years but does not impact dividend projections for later years.

For instance, let’s say the dividend projection for Company A above is cut by 10% for Year 1 but returns to $1 per share in Year 2 onwards and the liquidation value at the end of Year 10 is still $5. The table shows the new expected dividend schedule and the intrinsic value of the stock.

YearDividendNet present value
Now$0.00$0.00
Year 1$0.90$0.82
Year 2$1.00$0.83
Year 3$1.00$0.75
Year 4$1.00$0.68
Year 5$1.00$0.62
Year 6$1.00$0.56
Year 7$1.00$0.51
Year 8$1.00$0.47
Year 9$1.00$0.42
Year 10$6.00$2.31
Sum$14.90$7.98

In this case, the intrinsic value drops to $7.98 from $8.07. Only a small decline in the stock price is warranted if the stock was initially trading close to its $8.07 intrinsic value since the decline in intrinsic value is only minimal. 

Delaying cash flows to the shareholder

Expectations can also change about the timing of cash flows paid to shareholders. This will also impact the intrinsic value of a stock.

For the same company above, instead of dividends per share declining, the dividends are paid out one year later than expected. The table below shows the new expected dividend schedule and the present value of the cash flows.

YearDividendNet present value
Now$0.00$0.00
Year 1$0.00$0.00
Year 2$1.00$0.83
Year 3$1.00$0.75
Year 4$1.00$0.68
Year 5$1.00$0.62
Year 6$1.00$0.56
Year 7$1.00$0.51
Year 8$1.00$0.47
Year 9$1.00$0.42
Year 10$1.00$0.39
Year 11$6.00$2.10
Sum$15.00$5.24

As you can see this has a bigger impact on intrinsic value. The intrinsic value of the stock drops to $5.24 from $8.07. But this is a pretty extreme example. We have delayed all future cash flows by one year. In most cases, our expectations may not change so drastically. For instance, Year 1’s dividend may just be pushed to Year 2. The table below illustrates this new scenario.

YearDividendNet present value
Now$0.00$0.00
Year 1$0.00$0.00
Year 2$2.00$1.65
Year 3$1.00$0.75
Year 4$1.00$0.68
Year 5$1.00$0.62
Year 6$1.00$0.56
Year 7$1.00$0.51
Year 8$1.00$0.47
Year 9$1.00$0.42
Year 10$6.00$2.31
Sum$15.00$7.99

In this case, the intrinsic value only drops by a few cents to $7.99.

Conclusion

A change in expectations for a company has an impact on intrinsic value. But unless the expectations have changed dramatically, the change in intrinsic value is usually small.

Fluctuations in stock prices are more often than not overreactions to new information that the market is prone to make. Most of the time, the new information does not change the expectations of a company drastically and the stock price movements can be considered unjustified. This is the case if the stock price is trading close to its original intrinsic value to begin with.

But bear in mind, this works both ways. Stock price pops can also be considered unjustified depending on the situation. As investors, we can use any mispricing of stocks to earn a good long-term return.


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. I have no vested interest in any companies mentioned. Holdings are subject to change at any time.